![]() ![]() The broader point is that differing intelligence pictures can lead to different policy prioritization, which can impede defense coordination. The United States, for example, releases information to foreign partners differently depending on their status as an ally, partner, or member of the Five Eyes group. That said, Sweden and Finland’s nonaligned status puts a limit on how much sensitive information NATO members can share with them. All countries in this study have publicly committed to greater intelligence sharing. Negotiations over Arctic defense policy get complicated when countries advocate for a principal role for their favored institution and others disagree.įinally, there is the question of intelligence sharing. Canada instead prioritizes the role of NORAD as the more appropriate entity to handle defense of the North American continent. Canada supports a strong NATO role in the European High North but objects to a NATO role in the North American Arctic. Other countries, like Norway and Denmark, prioritized the role of NATO in their defense policies, which makes sense given their local circumstances. Sweden and particularly Finland have prioritized an EU role in the Arctic on the political, economic, and even military fronts. These countries also differ in their approach to international institutions. Norway has prioritized Arctic security, particularly in its maritime and air domains, because the nation relies so heavily on those domains not only for commerce but for economic and political viability as well. The Finns, Swedes, and Danes have prioritized Baltic Sea security because that is where their interests are most at stake. ![]() The late Tip O’Neill, speaker of the US House of Representatives from 1977 to 1987, was famous for saying, “All politics is local.” With regard to Arctic defense policy, perhaps all security is local. The priority each nation places on Baltic Sea security versus Arctic security varies. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, no country in this study believes it can deter or survive a military confrontation by acting alone. There is agreement that any such conflict might only affect parts of the Arctic (i.e., portions of the transit route known as the GIUK Gap, or the Norwegian Sea, or the Kola Peninsula) rather than the whole of Arctic territory and maritime area. Instead, the consensus seems to be that a conflict with Russia could spill over into the Arctic from a Baltic Sea crisis, an accident or incident in the Barents or Norwegian Seas, or an escalatory move arising from a conflict somewhere else such as renewed fighting in Ukraine. That threat may not manifest in direct, purposeful attack on any Arctic state or its Arctic assets. There is widespread, though not universal, agreement that Russia poses a military security threat to the Nordic states, especially among each country’s military establishment. Points of congruence and points of friction between Arctic allies and partners With the ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine, the potential for leveraging these capabilities has become all too real. In short, Russian capabilities in the Arctic could be useful for operations in both the Arctic and against neighboring states. The deployment of Iskander-M, a nuclear-capable missile with a range of at least 700 kilometers, to Kaliningrad put the Baltic states, Poland, eastern Germany, and southern Finland and Sweden at risk. Petersburg, and Kaliningrad covered the airspace across Finland and the Baltic states, northern Sweden and Norway, southern Sweden, most of Poland, and parts of Germany. For example, Russian air defenses located in Severmorosk, St. Yet Russian capabilities also created significant problems for the United States and NATO in defending the Baltic states from Russian coercion and potential invasion. Some of these capabilities could help with search and rescue efforts along the Northern Sea Route and serve the defensive purpose of protecting Russian strategic nuclear forces from US conventional attack. The Russian military deployed advanced air defenses, interceptor aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and offensive tactical weapons. Russia refurbished or built new military bases and capabilities along its northern and western borders. Russia deployed advanced military capabilities across its Arctic territory, capabilities that support an anti-access, area-denial approach to defending their strategic assets. At the same time, Russia was quickly developing capabilities that could threaten Arctic states. ![]() That all changed in early 2014 with events in Ukraine. Before that annexation, the belief across Europe and in much of the developed world was that armed conflict in Europe was something that belonged to a bygone era. Today’s Arctic defense policies are to some extent encumbered by the period between roughly 1990 through the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014. ![]()
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